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Facts, Flaws and Findings*
I. Introduction: Past Intra-Soviet Union Trade Patterns: Obsolete
Information or Useful Clues?
Since August 1991 the inarch of the Soviet Union into disarray has
accelerated. Some former Soviet Union republics have declared their
independence unilaterally, while others, the Baltic States, have
been recognised as new independent members of the International
Community. Which institutional and monetary framework of a possible
successor of the Union will finally be agreed upon and who the mem-
bers of a new grouping will be has controversially been discussed in
Fall 1991.
In sharp contrast to trends in political disintegration, economic
integration is at an overproportionately high level. The joint IMF/
World Bank/OECD/EBRD study (in the following cited as IMF report
1991) stresses that in 1988 inter-republican merchandise trade
amounted to 21 per cent of GDP and was about four times the size of
extra-union exports. For comparison, intra-EC and extra-EC trade in
merchandise trade plus services amounted to 14 per cent of GDP only
[IMF Report, Vol. 1, p. 193-194].
It goes without saying that in the case of the Soviet economy
this share is strongly upward-biased by political interference into
resource allocation. The command economy tied the republics to a
centrally planned inter-sectoral and inter-industry division of
labour thus denying them extra-union sourcing and selling. But even
without such a system one could assume that a number of land-locked
and geographically remote republics as in Central Asia would have
found a natural trading partner in the giant among the republics,
that is Russia [Kiss, 1987]. Hence, there is support for the hy-
pothesis that both the command economy and the remoteness and back-
*
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Pajevic and Susanne Tobias in getting access to Soviet statistics.wardness of some republics have given rise to a volume of economic
interactions among republics which cannot not rapidly be replaced by
new links to OECD countries. As regional trade structures are gene-
rally characterised by a certain degree of inertia in Western type
economies, stronger trends of inertia can be expected to emerge in
economies which lack managerial human capital in general and knowl-
edge of extra-union markets in particular. Thus, sectoral and regio-
nal patterns of inter-republican trade are likely to be fairly
robust as long as this bottleneck factor is still binding.
As a result, an enquiry into past sectoral and regional patterns
of inter-republican trade still seems relevant even if the institu-
tional basis vanishes rapidly. However, such an enquiry faces a
number of formidable obstacles, both conceptual and empirical ones,
and thus is subject to many qualifications.
To start with,,. Perestroyka in Soviet statistics [Treml, 1988]
reached trade statistics not earlier than 1990 when for the first
time detailed data on inter-republican exports and imports were
released for one year, that is 1988 [Belkindas, Sagers 1990, p.
651]. It is assumed that these data are based on the republican
input-output tables for 1987. They were not published prior to 1987
though they were computed every five years when the input-output
tables were constructed [Treml, 1989]. Thus neither an analysis of
time series nor a comparison of two periods is possible. Enquiries
have to rely on a flashlight picture for 1988.
Secondly, figures are disaggregated by intra-union and extra-
union exports only. To construct a matrix of bilateral trade flows
between individual republics is again not possible.
Thirdly, values of intra-union exports and imports are heavily
influenced and distorted by the price structure which does not re-
flect relative scarcities but political priorities. Consumer goods,
for instance, and processed food and beverages have entered trade
balances with a high price because of turnover taxes and distribu-
tion mark-ups. Taxes and mark-ups are counted as part of the con-sumption fund of the importing republic. Heavy industries, primary
commodities and unprocessed agricultural products, however, are
priced at a low level because of subsidies and therefore have a
relatively small weight in trade balances. As a consequence,
republics specialised in exporting low-price commodities while im-
porting high-price consumer goods show systematically downward-
biased trade balances while the opposite holds for the republics
specialised in exporting consumer goods and food.
Fourthly, ratios between extra-union and intra-union trade are
distorted as well. As far as exports are concerned, extra-union
exports are downward-biased in value terms (compared to world market
prices) because Soviet republics mostly export primary commodities
to third countries {which are priced at a low level). On the other
hand, extra-union imports which typically consist of industrial
products show a much higher price than the state trade monopoly
actually paid for them. Belkindas and Sagers [ibid, p. 639] report
that in some cases the ratio between domestic and foreign prices may
reach as high as 10 so that foreign imports expressed in domestic
prices are strongly overstated. That means that for republics ex-
porting raw commodities to third countries while exporting consumer
goods to other republics, the ratio extra-union exports to intra-
union exports is systematically too low. Alternatively, if they
import consumer goods from extra-union sources and import commodi-
ties from other republics, the corresponding import ratio is strong-
ly overstated. A view on the production pattern of individual repub-
lics thus allows for roughly tracing the direction of distortions in
their trade balances.
Therefore, Chapter II opens the discussion by highlighting the
differences between the former republics as far as their integration
into the network of intra-union supplies and deliveries is con-
cerned. Chapter III scrutinises sectoral and regional patterns of
extra-union and intra-union trade flows in value terms before turn-
ing to own estimates of Goskomstat (Central Statistical Authorities
of the Soviet Union) on trade balances in world market prices (Chap-
ter IV). Chapter V tries to figure out specialisation profiles ofthe major republics in their trade relations with the Union on the
basis of traded volumes. In Chapter VI some tentative hypotheses on
the major issues of a forthcoming economic union between legally
independent republics are derived from past trade patterns as well
as from experiences of decolonisation in developing countries.
II. The Openness of former Soviet Republics: Extraordinary Differ-
ences at a High Level of Inter-Republican Integration
It is well known that differences in market size and resource
endowment between the former republics are extraordinarily high. The
range spans from Russia comprising more than three quarter of the
territory, more than half of the population and more than 60 per
cent of net output to republics like Tadzhikistan, Kirgisia or
Armenia with fractions of a percentage point for each indicator.
Table 1 reports estimated shares of intra- and extra-union trade
in national income produced (NIP) for 1988. They mirror different
degrees of openness of republican economies and also - in the con-
text of socialist planning - of dependence.
The regional disaggregation of industrial output by republics and
products is reported in Appendix Table 1. Apart from the strong
Russian and Ukrainian position in many products, some interesting
specialisation profiles of the former republics emerge. For in-
stance, the Baltic states are highly specialised in consumer
durables (i.e. radios, TV sets), while the Caucasian republics
have their strongholds in the processing of textile fibres which
is known to be relatively labour-intensive from the perspective
of developing countries. Belorussia seems to have focused on the
production of basic chemicals and chemical products. So has
Uzbekistan on the production of vegetable oils. Some patterns
appear as typical outcomes of the Socialist inter-industry type
of division of labour, such as the fact that in 1988 Uzbekistan
accounted for one quarter of the Union production of electric
hoists or that Tadzhikistan commanded a relatively large share of
production of washing machines, or that Moldavia was specialised
on bicycles for adults while Kazakhstan kept the same share in
bicycles for children. Much higher rates of concentration of
production on a single plant are reported for capital goods. For
some products, they approach 100 per cent [Sagers, Heleniak,
Dunlop, 1991; Kroll, 1991, p. 145]. To analyse the extremely high
degree of specialisation within the Union in all its regional
facets more in detail, however, would go beyond the scope of this
paper.Table 1: Estimated Shares of Intra- and Extra-Union Trade in National Income Produced by Indi-




























































































































Source: Calculated from Belkindas/Sagers, 1990, Table 2 and Vestnik Statistiki, No. 3, 1990.
The main messages to be drawn from Table 1 can be summarised as
follows:
First, the openness is very high for the smaller former repub-
lics. It approaches 80-90 per cent for the Baltic states and Molda-
via and exceed, except for the two large republics Russia and
Ukraine, the 50 per cent level in each republic. This share is even
downward-biased for those republics which import administratively
underpriced commodities.Secondly, the export share in total value added is again the
highest for the Baltic states and the lowest for Russia followed
- somewhat surprisingly - by Kazakhstan. As concerns imports one can
expect a bias in this share, this time in the upward direction, if
overpriced consumer goods enter into the export basket. As will be
shown below, this bias is relevant for the Baltic States in particu-
lar .
Thirdly, in general intra-union trade exceeds extra-union trade
the more, the more the former republics are geographically remote
from the traditional trading partners outside the Union, the Euro-
pean countries of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA). But apparently economic distance as a catch-all variable for
all transport-related transaction costs has not been the only deter-
minant of managed trade between the Eastern European countries and
the former republics. While Russia displays the highest extra-union
export share, the remote republics of Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan
follow next. Probably, political considerations may have easily
2
overridden arguments of cost advantages so that even costs of long-
distance transport from Central Asia to Eastern Europe did not serve
as a strong impediment to extra-union exports.
Fourthly, the gap between extra-union imports and exports is much
larger than in intra-union trade. This suggests that in the CMEA
framework the Eastern European countries with their relatively
strong industrial base served as important sources for the former
republics while the latter primarily had to satisfy demand coming
from other republics in the Union. Thus, unlike CMEA countries like
Hungary, Poland and the GDR, all former republics of the Union were
more or less isolated from trade relations outside the Union. In
fact, the intra-union division of labour has been a case sui generis
within the larger context of the intra-CMEA division of labour. If
Yet, exports of the Central Asian republics to the non-European
members of the CMEA, that is Cuba, Mongolei and Vietnam, or to
Socialist countries in the developing world (for instance, Ethio-
pia, Afghanistan. Angola, Laos, Mozambique, PR Jemen) would also
explain relatively high export shares.the consequences of such "splendid isolation" are extrapolated to
the post-1991 situation of widely independent entities exposed to
world market prices, a number of bottlenecks arise which are lacking
(or at least are not as serious) in Eastern European countries. For
instance, knowledge of non-Soviet markets can be expected to be very
limited in many former republics. Barriers of communication are
formidable and product standards and norms in the industrial sector
are likely to be almost entirely Union-specific.
III. Sectoral Patterns of Intra-and Extra-Union Trade of Former
Republics
Raw data on 1988 trade flows in domestic prices are reported in
Appendix Table 2. In general, statistical discrepancies arise with
respect to the sums of individual sector balances over all repub-
lics. They should be zero but emerge to be positive and negative.
Two explanations are possible. First, there is wrong accounting (the
same product is grouped in different sectors of the exporting and
importing republic) and second, deviations are likely between pro-
ducer's prices in which the input-output tables are denominated and
purchaser's prices for the trade data [Belkindas, .Sagers, pp. 648-
659] .
Because of the price distortions, no emphasis should be given to
interpret trade balances. They are economically meaningless. For
instance, it is obviously due to underpriced exports of raw materi-
als why all republics run a deficit in extra-union trade and why
most republics show a deficit in total trade too. Balances of indi-
vidual republics are artificially upward-biased if small quantities
of consumer goods' exports are given an overproportionate weight
because of high prices. Sectoral structures in inter-republican
trade are also meaningless as ratios between intra-union agricul-
tural and industrial exports and imports are downward-biased. This
explains why the smallest share of industrial exports (including
energy products) in total intra-union exports of individual repub-
lics is still higher than 81 per cent (in the case of Kazakhstan).
For the majority of the republics this share amounts to more than 90
per cent.Hence, the only useful findings can be derived from industry-wise
specialisation profiles because in each industry flaws of wrong
prices can be assumed as systematic.
Here the following results emerge for intra-union trade. First,
Russia is the major exporter of forestry products (72 per cent of
total intra-union exports), oil and gas (almost 60 per cent) and
non-ferrous metals (53 per cent). It ranges next to the Ukraine as
the largest exporter of ferrous metals (iron and steel).
Second, Russia and Ukraine are dominant hosts of a large number
of industries. They account for 86 per cent of total intra-union
exports of iron and steel, almost 70 per cent of exports of non-
ferrous metals, 68 per cent of construction materials and 65 per
cent of coal exports.
Thirdly, Russia is the major net importer of agricultural prod-
ucts (66 per cent of total intra-union agricultural imports and only
5 per cent of exports) and nicely complements to the Ukrainian pat-
tern of large agricultural exports (27 per cent). In this respect
the two republics are almost ideal trading partners.
Fourthly, Belorussia's relative export stronghold is in chemicals
and petrochemicals and consumer industries. It depends on intra-
union imports of energy products, iron, steel and non-ferrous me-
tals .
Fifthly, the Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan, Kirghizia,
Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia) are major net exporters of electric
power (23 per cent of intra-union exports) and to a smaller extent
of non-ferrous metals.
Sixthly, among the smaller republics the most distinctive specia-
lisation profile arises for Kazakhstan. Viewed against its total
share in intra-union exports (less than 5 per cent), its contribu-
tion to intra-unioli exports of coal (30 per cent), agricultural
products (25 per cent) and also electric power (12 per cent) de-serves attention. So does the fact that in two of the three indus-
tries (electric power and coal) it is a strong importer too. Presum-
ably, there are locational factors (border trade with different
neighbouring republics) which have been instrumental to this sort of
two-way trade. Its import pattern is outstanding as well. In 1988
the republic absorbed 19 per cent of intra-union imports of electric
power, 17 per cent of fuels, 14 per cent of forestry products and 11
per cent of construction materials, compared to a share in total
USSR national income produced of only 4.3 per cent.
Seventhly, the three Caucasian republics (Armenia, Georgia and
Azerbaijan) add overproportionately to intra-union food exports
(about 20 per cent) and in the case of Azerbaijan to oil and gas
exports (8 per cent).
Eighthly, Moldavia ranges among the least commodity-abundant re-
publics with an extraordinarily high coal consumption covered
through intra-union imports (almost 14 per cent of total coal im-
ports) . Given its dependence on commodity imports and specialisation
on industrial exports, an adjustment to world market prices would
certainly lead to a large deterioration of the Moldavian trade
balance thus signalling a need of exchange rate depreciation in a
Western type economy.
Finally, the three Baltic states reveal similar sectoral patterns
as Moldavia. They are resource-poor and net exporters of consumer
industries and food products. Unlike Moldavia they are important
exporters of electric power (almost 22 per cent of intra-union ex-
ports) but depend on imports of oil, gas and coal as major inputs of
industrial production including electric power.
Extra-union trade has been much more concentrated on few repub-
lics than intra-union trade. Interestingly enough, Russia has kept a
dominant position in extra-union exports ranging from 95 per cent of
extra-Union exports in forestry products to 37 per cent in consumer
industries (70 per cent on average for all products). Except for
electric power and the quantitatively irrelevant sector "other10
fuels", Russia tops the list of all republics exporting externally
in all but one sector (ferrous metals). In the latter sector it
ranges next to the Ukraine which is the second-largest extra-union
exporter. In 1988 the two republics accounted for 85 per cent of all
extra-union exports of former USSR republics.
Outliers as far as overproportionate extra-union exports of other
republics are concerned are Uzbekistan in consumer industries (33
per cent of extra-union exports), Kazakhstan in non-ferrous metals
(14 per cent) and Moldavia in electric power (13 per cent).
To summarise, if- under the current structure of production - we
assume primary commodities to be the most valuable assets of indi-
vidual republics and industrial products to become uncompetitive in
the short run after the opening of markets and adjusting to interna-
tional prices, only two republics reveal a promising profile, that
is Russia and Ukraine. In addition, the excellent'agricultural base
makes Ukraine a natural trading partner of Russia and the Baltic
states. Next to the two republics range Kazakhstan with its resource
abundance in agriculture and coal and Azerbaijan with its petrobase.
The profiles of the other republics are more difficult to assess
as far as their potential for export earnings is concerned. They
rely much more on industrial products which are overpriced and pro-
bably designed for special purposes only (for instance, for military
purposes). To the extent that such products absorb human capital the
smaller republics would be well-advised to prevent high-skilled
workers from migrating to the large resource-abundant republics.
IV. Inter-Republican Trade in World Market Prices
In 1990, Goskomstat published own estimates on changes in bal-
ances of total republican trade (including extra-union trade) if
instead of domestic prices world market prices would have been ap-
plied to 1988 trade volumes. Unfortunately, no definition of world
market prices is given. Nor is there a distinction between intra-11




































































































































Source: Vestnik Statistiki, No. 4, 1990.
union and extra-union trade. Exchange rate effects and supply and
demand responses are ruled out. Thus, the results are sweeping but
point into the expected direction (Table 2).
For those republics which are specialised in commodity exports,
export prices would rise while the prices of their imports of indus-
trial products would decline. This is equivalent to a currency ap-
preciation .12
On the other hand, the exporters of industrial goods among the
republics would have to experience a decline of the export prices
while their imports of commodities would become more expensive.
Hence, this would be equivalent to a currency depreciation. The
latter group would therefore be in the same position as the smaller
Eastern European countries after the transition to world market
prices in their trade with the USSR in 1991.
Table 2 yields that only Russia would enjoy an increase in ex-
ports (in value terms) because of its clear profile of specialisa-
tion in commodities whereas for all other republics the balance of
rising prices for their commodity exports and declining prices for
their industrial goods' imports would be negative. On balance, their
export earnings would decline.
The pattern on the import side is widely equivalent to exports:
Russia would enjoy a sizeable cut in its import bill by 25 per cent.
So would other republics except Belorussia and Lithuania whose im-
ports would rise slightly.
The essential message of accounting trade flows in world market
prices is that all republics except Russia (and Turkmenia which
shows a zero balance) would face a trade deficit while Russia would
become a large creditor to all of them. (See for the Estonian case
the detailed estimates of Brown and Belkindas [1990] ). How large
deficits are and how much they differ among the republics emerges
from a comparison to national income produced (NIP) of the various
republics. Admittedly, this comparison is flawed as NIP should be
subject to accounting in world market prices too. Therefore, the
differences rather than the magnitude of deficits are worth men-
tioning. The range of deficits relative to NIP stretches from 2.8
per cent for the Ukraine to 4.5 per cent for Azerbaijan, 8.0 per
cent for Belorussia, 31.7 per cent for Estonia, 33.8 per cent for
Moldavia and finally 41.6 per cent for Lithuania. Some of these
shares are certainly beyond those of many developing countries even
Figures for NIP are drawn from Belkindas/Sagers, 1990, p. 634.
They are partly based on estimates.Bibliofhek
13 des Instituts fur Weltwirtschatf
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if different accounting is taken into consideration.
Such differences give rise to some hypotheses concerning monetary
integration in a post-1991 union. In fact, they signal considerable
problems which are likely to arise from a monetary union to be set
up by independent republics. Unless surplus republics concede to
transfer financial flows to deficit countries (or persuade an ex-
ternal donor to do so), a monetary union encompassing all former
fifteen republics would be suboptimal in size and probably break.
The divergences in resource endowment and level of development in-
dicate a demand for frequent exchange rate adjustments which cannot
be met in a monetary union. Instead, deficit countries should be
entitled to autonomously lower the price of their factors of pro-
duction denominated in the currency of the surplus country Russia in
order to stimulate their exports and import-competing domestic in-
dustries .
To put it differently, a lack of republican exchange rate poli-
cies as a tool of price adjustment and structural change would seri-
ously constrain other policies of the republics, such as wage poli-
cies and fiscal policies. Under world market prices, fixed nominal
exchange rates between Russia and other republics, and a lack of
financial redistribution between Russia and the deficit republics,
Russia would soon accumulate non-performing debts from the other
republics in its portfolio. Such claims upon the income of the other
republics could only be paid in kind, that is by low-quality and
overpriced industrial goods exports from the republics to Russia.
Such exports would have to exceed Russian exports in order to reduce
debts in real terms. Unless Russia would be prepared to implement
such a real transfer, it would stop exporting to the republics and
instead export to the rest of the world. Such a shift would be rela-
tively easy given the Russian export focus on homogeneous commodi-
ties. The effects of being cut off from Russian supply of commodi-
ties would be serious for the other republics, at least in the short
run.
4
A developing country with a chronically high trade deficit like
Egypt does not exceed trade deficit-GDP shares of 15 per cent.14
V. Inter-Republican Trade Volumes for Individual Products
The rapid process of economic disintegration in the USSR after
the events of August 1991 has casted a flash light on strong eco-
nomic dependencies between the republics. For instance, food securi-
ty is threatened if agricultural surplus republics should cease to
export agricultural goods to other republics. Shortages in private
and industrial production would emerge if coal mining republics
would unilaterally cut their deliveries. Future harvests would be
endangered if intra-union exports of inorganic fertilisers would be
reduced. In a centrally planned system any external shock injected
into the sophisticated and rigid chain of mutual supplies and deli-
veries immediately causes shock waves and repercussions for the en-
tire system as alternative supply is not available at short notice.
Table 3 lists inter-republican deliveries in six essential non-
agricultural products, that is coal, ferrous metal products, timber,
cement, paper and inorganic fertilisers, in order to identify stra-
tegically strong and weak positions of individual republics.
To start with coal, it has increasingly been replaced in recent
years by gas, nuclear power and oil as the major sources of energy
consumption but still accounts for almost 20 per cent of total
primary energy requirements [IMF Report, Vol. 3, p. 181].
Coal contributes primarily to electric power generation (40 per
cent of coal consumption) and also to iron and steel and non-ferrous
metal industries (20-25 per cent) as well as the household-municipal
sector (about 20 per cent). Any shortages in coal deliveries from
coal-mining republics to the consuming republics would therefore
affect exports of electric power from those republics which have no
resource base but which keep net export positions in secondary ener-
gy generation (for instance, Lithuania and Estonia as shown below).
As concerns the supply position of individual republics, there
has been a shift of production to Eastern republics (e.g. Kazakh-




























































































































































































































































sumption as a result of the development of coal-fired mine-mouth
power plants in the same republics [ibid, p. 192] . Yet, as major
consumption centres are still in the Western republics and as these
centres are technically oriented to consume Western coal (from the
Ukraine, for instance), two problems arose. First, power plants in
the West had to be converted technically in order to be able to use
Eastern coal which differs from Western coal, and secondly, long-
distance coal transport through the badly maintained railroad
network caused traffic jams and breakdowns.
In 1988, all republics imported coal from each other plus from
Eastern European countries while only three of them accounted for 97
- 5
per cent of intra-union exports (Table 3).
The largest net exporter is Kazakhstan which in 1988 exported
more than 40 per cent of its total production to the rest of the
Union. Russia and the Ukraine are the two other large exporting
republics which, unlike Kazakhstan, have a much higher domestic
demand for coal as the import figures witness. Also, their intra-
union export shares in domestic production (12 per cent and 14 per
cent, respectively) are much lower than that of Kazakhstan. Eight
republics do not export coal at all and according to Sagers [1990,
p. 298] fully depend on imports as no domestic resource base is
available.
Should these republics be cut off from intra-union imports
(because of a number of reasons) and instead had to buy coal from
world markets, the import bill would be considerably higher than the
net import balances in Rubles arising from Appendix Table 2.
Note that in Table 3 imports of coal include extra-union imports
(about 12 mill. metric tons from • Eastern Europe) while exports
exclude extra-union deliveries. However, the USSR did export coal
outside the union (in 1988/89 some 40 mill, metric tons), half of
which went to Eastern Europe and the other half to OECD coun-
tries, primarily to Japan. Total export volumes in Table 3 are
therefore incomplete.17
This is suggested by the following comparison for 1988 import
volumes:
Actual net import balance Estimated import bill for










Under the assumption of inelastic demand, a world market price for
power plant-suited coal of 44 US$/t (cif Northwest Europe) and a
market exchange rate of 6 Rubles/US-$ which is equivalent to ten
times the official rate valid in 1988. This equivalence factor has
been taken from the so-called special rate (basically a tourist
rate) which was introduced in November 1989 for the first time to
approximate market-determined exchange rates or black market rates
and which was set at ten times the official rate [IMF Report, p.
427] .
This scenario which disregards the impact of transport costs on
the import bill results in enormous hikes of the republican coal
bills which on average would be ten. times higher than the value of
intra-union imports. In absolute terms, Moldavia and Belorussia
would have to shoulder the largest part of the burden followed by
the Baltic states while in relative terms Turkmenia ranks first.
As already mentioned, shortages in access to coal would have
second-round negative effects on the industrial capacity of many
republics, for instance on the capacity of the Baltic States to sell
excess electric power to the other republics.
An even stronger inter-industry division of labour than in coal
exists in timber. In 1988, almost the entire volume of timber ex-18
ports came from Russia while the other republics were net impor-
ters .
In the other four groups and (products, respectively) some re-
latively outstanding profiles of export specialisation emerge for
the smaller republics, too. This holds for Belorussia and Kazakhstan
in exporting inorganic fertilisers, for Moldavia, Estonia, and
Lithuania in cement, for Latvia in paper and to some extent for
Moldavia in ferrous metal products. Contrary to these republics,
both the Central Asian republics and the Caucasian republics are net
importers in almost all strategy items (except for oil and gas from
Azerbaijan).
In total. Table 3 again shows Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to
be key sources for important industrial inputs processed throughout
the Soviet Union. These inputs are not only valuable in terms of
vertical linkages between the republics. In the short run, they are
also much more fungible on world markets than the industrial goods
available from the smaller republics. The three large republics are
thus very likely to enjoy an improvement of their income terms of
trade (that is, their capacity to import from hard currency areas)
vis-a-vis the other republics once the former Union should enter
into price reforms and open its markets.
The question remains whether the handicapped republics still have
an asset in a trading bloc with Russia in terms of agricultural
surpluses.
Again, a statistical inconsistency arises. Goskomstat reports
these figures for intra-union trade only. Thus, imports and ex-
ports should be balanced. This is not the case. Russian exports
exceed intra-union imports of the other republics by far. As it
is unlikely that traded volumes in an individual item are dif-
ferently categorised by importing and exporting republics, it the
possibility that extra-union trade is included in Russian exports
cannot be ruled out.19
Table 4 provides a breakdown of agricultural and consumer goods
exported by and imported from individual republics in 1988. Many
goods are perishable and thus face natural barriers to long-distance
transport within the Union while others are more durable or even
processed.
To concentrate on the latter group, some smaller republics indeed
appear as important agricultural surplus areas for the deficit
areas. The largest net importing republic is Russia which in 1988
absorbed almost two third of the Union agricultural imports but
contributed to less than 17 per cent to exports. Not surprisingly,
among the net exporters the Ukraine has kept strong positions in
many items, for instance in sugar (almost 80 per cent of union ex-
ports) , eggs and egg products (65 per cent), canned vegetables and
bakery products (each 45 per cent).
Among the smaller republics Belorussia in potatoes (54 per cent),
Uzbekistan in vegetables (almost 30 per cent), vegetables oils (26
per cent) and tomato products (32 per cent), Moldavia in fruit and
canned food (between 25 and 34 per cent), Lithuania in dairy prod-
ucts (19 per cent) and Georgia in canned fruits (18 per cent) add
overproportionately to satisfying demand in other republics.
To exhaust the agricultural potential of the Southern European
and Southern Asian republics of the Union, free access to primary
energy and fertilisers from Russia, Belorussia, Ukraine and Kazakh-
stan is required, not to speak of the institutional essentials of
private property rights and price reform. Should these interdepen-
dences be interrupted as a result of political separatism or eco-
nomic decay, the alternatives for those republics which rely upon
agricultural exports appear to be gloomier than those for commod-
ity-exporting republics. Absorptive OECD markets outside the Union
are difficult to contest because of agricultural protectionism and
domestic excess supply. Other markets which are neighboured (Roma-
nia, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) are either not absorptive in terms
of purchasing power or suffer from hard currency shortages (see as a
proof the failure of agreements on expanding mutual trade between
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990, pp. 52-54]).Table 4: Trade Balance of Former Soviet Republics in Agricultural and Industrial Products, 1988, in percent of total Union Trade
Food products (except alcoholic
beverages) in value terms

















Total non-food products (in value terms)
Non-food products except light industries
Light industries of which
Fabrics (in volume terms)
Garments (in value terms)
Underwear (in volume terms)
Leather footwear (in volume terms)
Furniture (in value terms)
Cars (in units)
Corrmodities for light industries





















































































































































































































































































































to be continued..Table 4 continued
Food products (except alcoholic
beverages) in value terms

















Total non-food products (in value terms)
Non-food products except light industries
light industries of which
Fabrics (in volume terms)
Garments (in value terms)
Underwear (in volume terms)
Leather footwear (in volume terms)
Furniture (in value terms)
Cars (in units)
Corrmodities for light industries






















































































































































































































































































































Food products (except alcoholic
beverages) in value terms

















Total non-food products (in value terms)
Non-food products except light industries
Light industries of which
Fabrics (in volume terms)
Garments (in value terms)
Underwear (in volume terms)
Leather footwear (in volume term)
Furniture (in value terms)
Cars (in units)
Cotrirodities for light industries

























































































































































































































































































Source: Table 2, own calculations.23
Political disputes of ethnical groups and poor transport infra-
structure are further impediments against a strategy of "looking
South" of the Southern Union republics.
Among the net agricultural exporters the Ukraine probably ranks
best as far as its capacity is concerned to adjust to a sudden break
of inter-republican economic relations. This republic has an own
strong agricultural base and in addition enjoys well-developed re-
sources of energy and mineral ores. Such resources could be capi-
talised on world markets and thus would yield badly needed foreign
exchange earnings. Geographical proximity to Western markets, a
fairly high degree of ethnical homogeneity, and complementarity in
production patterns with the European part of Russia are further
7
assets of the Ukraine.
The regional distribution of traded goods in light industries in
Table 4 underlines the industrial backwardness of Central Asian
states which emerge as commodity sources only (for instance, Uzbe-
kistan in cotton fibres). In addition, the Caucasian states rank
highly as exporters in textile industries and so do the Baltic
states in wood processing (furniture).
Yet, considerable caution is at stake when interpreting the pre-
1991 trade figures in the industrial sector as far as their rele-
vance for post-1991 is concerned. Such regional patterns could
easily become fully obsolete if industries would fail to meet con-
ditions of pricing at world market level or would have to lay off
capacities because of being cut off from intra-USSR sourcing.
VI. Pre-1991 intra-Union Interdependencies in the Light of Post-
1991 Disintegration: Some Preliminary Hypotheses
By November 1991 the. future direction of the intra-union division
of labour and its institutional underpinnings are still uncertain.
This view finds support in a ranking of Union republics by their
economic potential published by the Deutsche Bank [Deutsche Bank,
1991, p. 9 and 45]. In this ranking the Ukraine tops the list of
the republics.24
What we know is that under socialist planning each republic and
within each republic each plant was tied into a rigid inter-sec-
toral, inter-industry and even inter-product pattern of supplies and
deliveries which led to an extreme overspecialisation. It is evident
that such patterns will have a short living in a process of market
reforms but in which direction changes will move depends - among
other things - on the new institutional framework underlying the
future inter-republican transactions.
The uncertainty with respect to the framework holds for the real
sphere, that is whether independent units will form a free trade
area, a customs union or another preferential trading arrangement or
will opt for a complete delinking, as well as for the monetary
sphere. Possible options for the latter sphere are a full-fledged
monetary union, or a monetary arrangement with an anchor currency
and discretionary parity realignments, or different national ex-
change rate regimes with single currency pegs or basket pegs'.
Unless these institutional arrangements are settled and detailed
documentation about existing bilateral trade links and financial
flows between individual republics becomes available, there is no
ground at all for drawing conclusions from heavily distorted trading
patterns. For instance, to assess which republics would be well-
advised to negotiate viable common monetary and trade policies and
which ones would better look for new links, requires information on
different regional clusters of economic activities in merchandise
trade and financial flows. This information is either not available
or seriously flawed by the peculiarities of central planning [Brown,
Belkindas, 1990, pp. 25-26].
One could be tempted to draw conclusions from disintegration
experiences outside the Soviet Union but again such comparisons are
open to a large number of qualifications and caveats given the
unique nature of the intra-union pattern of overspecialisation.
Nonetheless, what comes to mind is the experience of disintegra-
tion processes in colonial-type arrangements between young indepen-
dent economies and the former Metropolitan economy, such as between25
France and its former West and Central African colonies at the be-
ginning of the sixties. In fact, beyond many differences some simi-
larities are striking. For instance, during the colonial period the
satellite economies concentrated almost all their trade and capital
flows on the metropolitan economy. The latter enjoyed implicit in-
come transfers received from the satellites through exports of over-
priced manufactures to them. Such transfers were partly offset by
overpriced commodity exports from the satellites to the metropolitan
economy, but the net transfer remained positive for the latter.
During the colonial period there was a monetary union as well as a
customs union. When the satellites became independent, the customs
union with the metropolitan economy was dissolved while the monetary
union was continued in a different form.
The results from these disintegration processes between countries
at very uneven levels of economic development suggest the following
hypotheses:
First, if after correct accounting of intra-union trade flows in
world market prices the Metropolitan country enjoys a large surplus
(as it was the case with France and appears to be the case with
Russia), the sustainability of a monetary union depends on a perma-
nent flow of financial resources from the Metropolitan economy to
the backward economies. France did so over thirty years and thus
sustained the so-called Franc Zone. Whether Russia would be prepared
to follow this example or whether an external donor would be pre-
pared to play the Russian part is open.
Secondly, the benefits of a fifteen-countries Convertible Ruble
area sponsored by compulsory financial transfers from the surplus to
the deficit areas do not stand up to scrutiny. Again, the Franc Zone
example suggests a negative judgement. The Zone has denied backward
countries access to exchange rate policies as an instrument to lower
prices of domestic factors of production in the currency of the
surplus country, that is to gain competitive advantages vis-a-vis
the surplus country in line with differences in the resource endow-
ment. Instead, if deficit countries cannot adjust their exchange
rates autonomously, the burden of adjustment to international prices
- as argued before - rests with other policies (for instance, wage26
policies or fiscal policies). The African experience clearly shows
that such substitutes have failed to play the role of exchange rate
policies. Backward countries soon became victims of an imitation
effect, that is allowing real wage rates in backward areas to climb
up to the level of the surplus countries. In other words, should the
discrepancies between core countries and backward countries become
more pronounced after changing the accounting system to world market
prices, the maximum size of a Convertible Ruble area, that is the
territory of the former Soviet Union, would very unlikely to be the
optimum size.
Thirdly, a monetary union covering the territory of the former
Soviet Union would not only be costly for the low-skilled labour-
abundant backward countries vis-a-vis the core countries accumu-
lating capital. It would also expose member countries with a promis-
ing industrial base to external shocks "imported" from the commodi-
ty-rich member countries through Ruble/Dollar rate fluctuations as a
result of volatile commodity prices. This argument rests on the
assumption that the future Convertible Ruble/Dollar rate will very
much depend on the international price of commodities exported by
the members of the Ruble area, primarily by Russia. Exported com-
modities seem to be better candidates for surviving the process of
real adjustment compared to manufactured goods, at least during the
transition period. Sudden price hikes, for instance, would then lead
to an appreciating Ruble (in real terms), that is to an increase of
prices of non-traded goods relative to traded goods (unless the
resource inflows are sterilised). An appreciating Ruble, however,
would damage the export prospects of commodity-poor countries in the
Ruble area. Such "Dutch disease" problems also emerged in the Franc
Zone occasionally (for instance, after the 1977 coffee price boom).
As inflows were not sterilised, they led to public overspending and
to losses in international competitiveness of manufactured goods.
Fourthly, turning to the real sphere, the intensity of past
intra-Union trade flows provides some support for maintaining a
trading arrangement, that is not to impose internal barriers to
trade. Preferably, this arrangement should cover a customs union
rather than a free trade area because the latter would require con-
trols of rules of origin in order to discourage trade deflection.27
Trade deflection, that is indirect external imports via the member
country with the lowest external tariff, would occur if the indi-
vidual countries would opt for very different levels of external
protection. Given the differences in the specialisation pattern and
the resource endowment, however, some former republics might prefer
high external protection for infant-industry arguments while repub-
lics relying on their natural resource base might opt for low pro-
tection. A free trade area comprising countries with such different
levels of external protection would inevitably be trade-diverting
and costly for the non-members as well as for the high-tariff coun-
tries too. The latter countries would soon be caught in a trap of
regional import substitution without having a chance to compete
successfully on markets of non-member countries. A customs union in
which the common external protection would be on the lowest possible
level appears as the best alternative. Again, the Franc Zone sup-
ports this argument. When the customs union between France and the
African countries was given up, the latter countries rapidly moved
into excessive and inefficient import substitution.
Whatever lessons can be drawn from such experiences, it is in any
case evident that the contractual underpinnings of future trade
flows and capital relations between independent and even sovereign
economies will be crucial for the direction and speed of the adjust-
ment process. What is known is that the starting conditions differ
widely among the economies because of differences in market size,
political and cultural homogeneity, resource endowment and back-
wardness. Such differences could mean that an all-embracing contrac-
tual solution may be too a costly compromise for some economies
while others will continue to link to the big economies, that is
Russia and the Ukraine. The larger the membership of a regional
economic grouping on the territory of the former Soviet Union will
be, the larger is the need for compromises and the more distribu-
tional conflicts will govern the principles of resource allocation
through the market. In this respect some countries will seriously
look for alternatives to a follow-up of the "ancient regime", per-
haps for sub-groupings with other former republics or for contrac-
tual links to Eastern European countries and the European Community.
The advantage of the latter would lie in a self-imposed externally
binding discipline in national policy-making.Appendix Table 1: Share of Individual Republics in Total Union Industrial Output, by Products, 1989 (in per cent)
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^rodnoe^Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 godu: statistjcheskii ezhegodnik (National Econaw of the USSR in 1989: Statistical Yearbook), Moscow: Finansy y statistika. 1990).Appendix Table 2: Intra-Union and Extra-Union Trade of Former Soviet Union Republics, 1988 (in Kill. Rubles!
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
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0.8(Appendix Table 2 continued)
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign . Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
(intra-union) (extra-union) (intra-union) (extra-union) (intra-union) (extra-union) (intra-union) (extra-union! (intra-union) (extra-union)












































































































































































































































































































































































u>(Appendix Table 2 continued)
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
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Source: Vestnik statistiki (Statistical Bulletin), Moscov: Finansy y statistika, various issues.33
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